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  1CHAIN QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN CO-OPERATIVES  
Jon H. Hanf, Agata Pieniadz
 ∗
Zusammenfassung 
This paper investigates the relationship between the chosen quality strategy and the vertical 
co-ordination mechanism of a focal company by using new institutional economics, as well as 
strategic management approaches. The theoretical findings are tested using evidence from 19 
of the largest Polish dairy cooperatives, surveyed in spring 2006. The results show that all co-
ops recognise the changing market requirements and are treating food quality as more than 
plain food safety and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set of attributes. 
However, compared to investor-owned dairies, co-ops are disadvantaged in quality-based 
competition due to their lower flexibility and access to financial and qualified human 
resources. To overcome this intense competition, co-ops modify their production profile, 
which leads to market segmentation. Moreover, the choice of quality strategy is an economic 
activity, guided by the co-op’s profit expectations within the selected market. The chosen 
quality strategy determines the design of the vertical co-ordination mechanism. Thus, the 
higher the requirements for the final product, the further quality management systems go 
beyond a firm’s boundaries, and the higher is the intensity of the relationships between the 
intermediary stages in the dairy chain. 
Keywords 
Network theory, relationship management, quality management, cooperatives, Poland.  
1 Introduction 
Because of the plenty food scandals of the last few years food quality is considered to be of 
major importance to all business operators in the food chains. However, for co-operatives 
quality management is one of the most challenging issues, since the co-ops must meet the 
interests of their agricultural members while satisfying sophisticated business customers. In 
our paper we argue that quality management is not bound to a single firm and consider an 
inter-firm perspective. Thus, we draw upon the definition of Hanf/Hanf (2005), who claimed 
that the most striking consequence of the dramatic food scares was the fact that politicians, 
consumers, producers and suppliers all assess food quality as no longer the matter of a single 
firm. However, not only chain quality management in a general sense has to be discussed. 
Motivated by the above-mentioned work we introduce a differentiation between an operative 
and a strategic chain quality management in our paper. Furthermore, we extend the theoretical 
framework by discussing the quality management approach from the co-operative’s point of 
view.  
The aim of this paper is to identify chain quality management by Polish dairy co-operatives. 
More specific we intend to identify which influence the chosen quality strategy exerts on the 
vertical co-ordination mechanism. In the first part of the paper, we present a brief review of 
the relevant theories. Following the theoretical discussion, the second portion of the paper 
details the relevance of quality management thoughts for the Polish dairy co-ops. 
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Germany 2 Theoretical  considerations 
There were several severe food crises in the years prior to the BSE- and FMD- crises in the 
winter of 2000/01, e.g. the Coke-scandal in Belgium, the BSE-crisis in the UK, and the wine-
scandal in Austria and Germany. However, the crisis in the winter of 2000/01 can be regarded 
as the straw that broke the camel’s back (Hanf/Hanf 2005). The growing concerns of 
consumers, producers and governments worldwide have influenced the political debate on 
food safety. In the European Union (EU) a variety of new standards have been set in order to 
ensure the demanded minimum level of food quality. The result of these developments is that 
food policy is becoming increasingly integrated across various sectors (Ugland/Veggeland 
2006). 
With increasing knowledge and perception of risk, consumer demand for safety and a 
willingness to pay for it increases (Antle 2001). At the same time, as incomes rise, consumers 
demand even more quality, including, besides safety, such attributes as nutritional value, 
product diversity and tightness of product specification. Providing credence attributes is 
becoming an integral and ubiquitous issue for business operators. Indeed, trust-based 
attributes are expanding and include, besides food safety and nutritional properties, different 
contextual product properties related to certain public goods or values, such as environmental 
justice or cultural (traditional) values, etc. (Allaire 2004). Consumer are, however, not able or 
willing to intensively and fully ascertain the credence characteristics of food products. Thus, 
they look for signals to facilitate their buying decisions, e.g. a well-known brand or a 
certificate of quality, thereby motivating the participants of the food chain to take the 
appropriate measures and to meet the ‘new quality’ demand (Hanf/Pieniadz 2006). 
Through the expansion and deepening integration of the EU, the quality-based competition 
among business operators has intensified. On the one hand, the minimum quality standards of 
the EU force low-quality producers to raise their quality or drop out of the market 
(Hockmann/Pieniadz 2006). On the other hand, the increasing demand for quality signals 
especially allows supermarkets and manufacturers of branded products to benefit from 
imposing voluntary, private quality and safety standards, some of which are even more 
stringent than similar governmental regulations. Hence, the use of private voluntary standards 
across food categories has been increasing in both long-standing EU members, as well as in 
transition countries (Spencer/Reardon 2005). Fulponi (2006) argues that private standards will 
become even more prominent in upcoming years as we observe increased market 
concentration and buying power in the retail sector, as well as its integration with financial 
markets. Unnevehr et al. (1999) assert that since food safety and quality can be successfully 
managed using private standards, their diffusion will henceforth even reduce the need for 
direct legal regulations. Thus, in order to meet the demanded new quality, food processors 
and retailers will have to enact additional mechanisms and re-design their food chains to 
induce the incentive-compatible behaviour of upstream business operators. Hanf/Hanf (2005) 
concluded that these demands on quality lead to the conceptualisation of chain quality 
management concepts by combining these ‘new quality’ demands with general chain 
management concepts. 
  Chain quality management 
The modern Agri-Food literature indicates that in the sector food supply chains systems are 
being formed (Boehlje 1999; Downey 1998; Hanf/Drescher 1994; Hendrikse/Bijman 2002; 
van Dijk 1997). Such vertical process organizations are most often designed as hybrid 
organizations i.e. as supply chain networks (Lazzarini et al. 2001; Neves 2003; Omta et al. 
2001; Zylbersztajn 2004). In general such networks can be characterised as pyramidal-
hierarchical strategic networks (Hanf/Kühl 2005a) possessing thereof a focal company (Jarillo 
1988; Wildemann 1997). In the context of supply chain networks and their management  
 
Hanf/Hanf (2005) highlight the distinction between strategic and operational partnering: 
Strategic partnering is defined as an “on-going, long-term, inter-firm relationship for 
achieving strategic goals, which deliver value to customers and profitability to partners” 
(Mentzer et al. 2000:550). The aim of strategic partnering is to improve or entirely alter a 
company’s competitive position through developing new products and technologies and by 
creating new markets (Webster 1992). Additionally, strategic partnering should also include 
exclusivity and non-imitability (Mentzer et al. 2000). Operational partnering is defined as a 
“needed, short-term relationship for obtaining parity with competitors” (ibid. p.550). Thus, an 
operational partnering strategy seeks to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. 
Such orientation involves shorter time spans and less organisational resources. Furthermore, 
in addition to such aspects of aligning interests, chain management has to consider aspects of 
coordination (Gulati et al. 2005) as well as the three levels within a network - namely firm, 
dyadic, and network levels (Duysters et al. 2004). In their framework on chain management 
Hanf/Dautzenberg (2006) combined these considerations with the thought that networks 
consist of different levels. They point out that these three aspects have to be mirrored in the 
collective strategy
1 of a supply chain network.  
Thus, if quality is the leading idea or strategy to be coordinated along the SCN, all members 
must share a homogeneous understanding of quality management, which provides the 
preconditions for the emergence of a collective strategy, and thus collective actions that 
address the chosen strategy. In this case, we expect a correlation between the chosen quality 
strategy and the design of the partnership. Therefore, the following assumption can be made 
in order to test it empirically in the second part of the study: If a firm chooses a pure cost 
leadership strategy, we expect that this firm will produce products that solely meet the 
minimum quality requirements. In this case, we expect that vertical exchange will take place 
by arm’s-length transactions, meaning that vertical co-ordination is more or less done via the 
(spot) market. Thus, it will be sufficient for a cost-optimising firm to develop operational 
partnerships in both upstream and downstream stages. If a firm chooses the opposite strategy 
of product differentiation and quality attributes (especially credence elements) are chosen as 
the means of differentiation, we expect the firm to develop more sophisticated relationships. 
Yet we expect that the differentiated firms are more likely to develop strategic partnerships. In 
this case, vertical co-ordination can be regarded as highly cooperative or even vertically 
integrated. 
3  Quality problems in co-operatives 
In the previous section we argued that food quality is no longer the matter of a single firm, but 
instead the whole food chain has to work together in order to deliver the ‘new quality’. 
However, Hanf/Schweickert (2003) as well as Hanf/Kühl (2005b) mention that due to their 
organisational form, co-operatives face problems integrating themselves in supply chain 
networks. A major reason for this is the co-op’s internal institutions governing the behaviour 
of the co-op’s members and affecting the co-op’s ability to manage the quality of its products. 
Arguments for this are the following: In the context of increasing vertically co-ordinated agri-
food systems, Sykuta/Cook (2001) showed that at the producer level, the most practical co-
ordination mechanism is contracting. Because of their very own property rights structure, 
producer co-ops have some advantage compared to investor-owned firms. However, in 
addition to these benefits, they also face some problems (James/Sykuta 2005). By using a 
property rights approach, Cook (1995) pointed out five general sets of problems: Free Riding 
Problems, Horizon Problems, Portfolio Problems, Control Problems and Influence Cost 
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concepts of opportunistic behaviour, conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and 
stochastic conditions, Eilers/Hanf (1999) show that it is not clear who is the principal and who 
is the agent, i.e., both the co-operatives and the members can be principals and agents. For 
this reason, neither leadership mechanisms nor selective terms of delivery can be enforced by 
the co-operatives, i.e., the members can deliver all the commodities which alternative dealers 
do not accept. Co-operatives that are to accept these commodities face the problem of adverse 
selection. Additionally, Fulton/Giannakas (2001) show that the cross-subsidisation and 
member heterogeneity in large centralised, multipurpose co-ops may lead to substantial 
financial pressures for the co-operative because members of such co-operatives do not see a 
strong connection between the success of the co-op and their own business. Furthermore, 
Karantininis/Zago (2001) showed, by applying a game theory model, that instead of selling 
their commodities to open co-ops, farmers would rather sell them to investor-owned firms if 
they had the choice. Fulton (1995) concludes that if markets disappear as a result of an 
increased vertical co-ordination, co-operatives may also begin to disappear. 
Hendrikse/Bijman (2002) share this assessment if investment on the side of the processor or 
retailer becomes more important for the total chain value than the investments by the farmers. 
In an empirical survey, Schramm et al. (2006) evaluated German dairy co-ops’ brands. Using 
institutional economic and behaviour approaches, they showed the strengths and weaknesses 
of co-ops’ branding strategies. Even though they were able to locate different factors exerting 
influence on branding strategies, quality issues were of major importance – negatively as well 
as positively. Besides these disadvantages, Briscoe/Ward (2006) name some managerial 
advantages of co-ops, as far as small and medium-sized co-ops are considered; These include 
better communications with farmers, staff flexibility, easier (more efficient) control, hands-on 
management, greater motivation, and identification. 
4  Chain quality management in Polish co-ops 
We surveyed 19 of the 22 largest Polish dairy cooperatives in February and March 2006. All 
of them are producer co-operatives with milk processing being their prime economic activity. 
Roughly equal numbers of semi-structured interviews were conducted across the various 
hierarchical levels in the co-ops, including chief executive officers, quality managers, and 
supervisors in the marketing and supply departments. The sequence of the questioned 
representatives was the same for each co-op. The interviews were conducted by telephone and 
lasted between 20 and 40 minutes per respondent. This technique made particular sense in 
view of the above-mentioned research questions: On the one hand, chain quality management 
as well as networks concern activities and processes that are challenging to quantify and may 
even be ambiguous or misunderstood. On the other hand, the topics are particularly sensitive 
in emerging markets. Moreover, in those markets there might be some unique and relevant 
developments which have to be first recognised, while giving the respondents some freedom 
to explore our general views. In the following, we elaborate on the relevance of the previously 
considered quality management thoughts based on the surveyed cooperatives. 
  Choice of quality strategy 
Generally we found, that all co-ops understand quality to be an important action competition 
parameter. At the same time, co-ops face a conflict between their principles and strategic 
goals i.e. quality orientation. However, the overall intensive competition is the main reason 
for the variety of the applied quality strategies among the coops. 
Co-ops which take the role of the focal firm in a dairy chain especially act to escape from 
price competition by setting themselves apart and bringing quality to a differentiating  
 
parameter. Investments in brand, reputation and reduction of information asymmetry about 
product quality (social marketing, TV spots, food exhibitions, etc.) are becoming a priority for 
this group. All of those co-ops use intensive ISO quality standards. Some of them also 
implemented voluntary ISO standards on environmental management and possess an adequate 
certificate integrating both systems, whereas the remaining manufacturers of branded 
products intend to implement them in the near future. The respondents of those co-ops 
stressed that the main incentive for implementing the voluntary environmental standards was 
to demonstrate their environmental concerns, and hence to increase their reputation and brand 
loyalty. Several dairies in that group additionally address region-specific credence attributes, 
such as cultural and traditional values of the area where the co-op is located, and social justice 
while stressing the importance of product purchase for employment in rural areas. In most 
cases this strategy leads to a kind of ‘local patriotism’ among consumers, as far as the 
purchase of the regional milk products is concerned. To stabilise their market shares and to 
protect their independence, the co-ops with a strong brand reject producing and selling their 
products under a private retailer’s label. This premium-quality strategy, however, usually 
concerns the largest of the investigated co-ops, and thus seems to be a minority when all 
Polish co-ops are considered. 
On the other ‘end’ of the investigated firms are co-ops that utilise a strong cost-orientation for 
their competitive advantage. Cost leadership is achieved by economies of scale, thus 
producing basic products and improving the efficiency of all business operations is a priority 
for this group. In those groups there are usually no dominant standard-setting purchaser, thus 
the dairies have some freedom in their choice of quality strategies and measures to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the chosen strategy. Accordingly, those co-ops offer their products at the 
cheapest price (price leadership) while meeting just the minimum quality as demanded by the 
obligatory regulations. The representatives of those co-ops argued that there is so far no need 
to change this strategy, since there is still a profound group of low income consumers who 
demand their products, and hence enable attractive profits. Because the firms do not posses a 
strong brand, they use voluntary public quality certifications and labels to signal quality, such 
as “Q” (quality) and “Eco” (ecological), developed and assigned by the Polish Centre for 
Testing and Certification (PCBC). Some standards promote national food products of high 
and reliable quality, such as the “Try Fine Food” standards (PDZ) designed by the Polish 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Representatives of the co-ops mentioned 
however, that they recognised that their products are currently threatened by the plurality of 
signs, which can sometimes even increase the uncertainty among consumers.
Between those two above-mentioned groups there are co-ops that are strongly dependent on 
direct purchasers. Usually these co-ops have no brand (or not a strong one) and regard the 
dominant purchaser as the standard-setting entities; they then adjust their quality strategy and 
management to the respective requirements. 
If the focal company is a manufacturer requiring tightly-specified industrial products, the co-
op has to adjust quality assurance systems to the specific requirements (i.e., unique chemical 
or physical parameters). Quality signals and voluntary quality systems seem to be irrelevant to 
those co-ops. Some FDI use the possibility of intra-industry trade based on the co-ops’ 
supply, since the co-ops have better access to the local milk suppliers. On the other hand, the 
co-ops benefit from the financial support of the focal firm, while carrying out relation-specific 
investments. Joint investments first concerned quality improvements at the procurement stage, 
and then the adoption of new processing technologies. The adherence to specific requirements 
is ensured by close business-to-business (B2B) relations, including some knowledge-sharing 
routines and enhanced monitoring. Additionally, in such direct relationships, the threat of 
direct and strong sanctions (losing the focal purchaser) limits opportunistic behaviour and 
facilitates cooperative adaptation by the co-op. At the same time, the high intensity of 
unexpected controls and enhanced monitoring suggests that the focal firm either does not trust the partner or must steadily improve the knowledge about its capability, as well as the 
correctness of the process.  
If a dairy sells its products to a retail chain and the retailer then sells them as proprietary 
private label products, the implementation of retailer-specific schemes will be required. Thus, 
the processors are voluntarily obligated to implement standards for auditing retailer-branded 
food products, such as IFS and BRC. Interestingly, the retailers are satisfied if those concepts 
are running but they do not need to be certified, which seems to be specific for an emerging 
market. In this case, the quality standards are used to coordinate pooled interdependencies. 
We found that focal firms prefer control-based relationships rather than trust-based ones to 
govern partnership behaviours and the maintenance of their specific requirements. In 
particular, retailers with strong bargaining power apply restrictive control mechanisms, even 
if the running quality concepts are certified. Adjustment to the retailer-specific requirements 
involves investment in specialised resources, which increases the co-ops’ dependence on 
retailers. However, because IFS and BRC are widely used standards, the co-ops have formal 
access to alternative institutional customers on the national or international markets. 
  Chain quality management 
The chosen quality strategy influences the vertical coordination mechanism along the dairy 
chain. In the next step we investigate the linkages between quality performance and the 
design and intensity of vertical relationships with the upstream and downstream stages by 
examining three groups identified in our data set.  
1) Manufacturers of branded products have recognised that they must actively create their 
own distribution opportunities. For all channels – retail, wholesale, and export – they use 
medium- and long-term contracts which contain all sorts of details that address product 
quality matters. Thus, the co-ops control, to some extent, quality measurements that are 
external to the firm. However, despite reciprocal information exchange and ongoing 
negotiations, these relationships still have an operational character. However, the co-ops 
increasingly use partnering mechanisms that are more strategic in nature, so marketing 
information such as point-of-sale data is exchanged. The co-marketing is particularly 
intensive in partnerships with retail chains, because it is based on ongoing negotiations and 
adjustments addressing sales strategies, promotions, and pricing behaviour. Typically, this 
leads to complex reciprocal interdependencies, which demand well-defined organisational 
principles and a certain level of management skills to govern the relationships. Such relation-
specific systems seem to be unique for an individual chain of branded products manufacturer. 
Interaction at the procurement stage can also be described as intensive, especially with the 
larger and specialised farmers. Using incentives to upgrade the quality of raw milk, the co-ops 
exert a firm boundary for the overlapping quality scheme. Some of the actions result from the 
implementation of ISO quality standards, which require quality objectives to be included in 
the quality policy and to be leveraged to upstream stages. Additionally, the co-ops provide 
intensive consulting assistance and herd management for their members. One co-op even 
provided business angles as an alternative know-how source (technology transfer) as early as 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Overall, we think that in this case, we can speak not only from 
a chain quality concept; instead, it is a strategic one. 
2) When the focal company is either a manufacturer or branded retailer, we found that 
purchasers prefer control-based relationships rather than trust-based ones to govern 
partnership behaviours and the maintenance of their specific requirements. In particular, 
retailers with strong bargaining power apply restrictive control mechanisms, even if the 
running quality concepts are certified. Adjustment to the retailer-specific requirements 
involves investment in specialised resources, which increases the co-ops’ dependence on the 
retailers. However, because IFS and BRC are widely-used standards, the co-ops have formal  
 
access to alternative institutional customers on the national or international markets. Contracts 
and managerial discretion are used to meet sequential interdependencies, with the contracts 
containing specifics on quality and payment. As long as these specifics are met, the duration 
is prolonged. Additionally, we found some reciprocal interdependencies among the partners 
in B2B relationships between the co-ops and the industrial purchaser. Overall, the 
relationships between the focal companies and the dairies are very intense. Therefore, this 
type of partnering is more strategic than operational. Regarding the relationship between co-
ops and their members, we found that co-ops encourage growth strategies through intensive 
consulting assistance, which aims to select larger farms, hence, they use economies of scale. 
Overall, we conclude that supply chain networks are established and chain quality 
management is exercised. However, even though the partnering can be described as more 
strategic in nature, there is a lack of a collective quality strategy. Thus, we would classify the 
paradigm as an operational chain quality management. Because more and more retailers are 
bringing their proprietary private label products on the market, there is increasing price 
competition among the products. For the concerned co-ops, this means that they face strong 
pressure on the costs, which precludes resource allocation to more sophisticated quality 
management systems. 
3) Because of the strong cost orientation of the basic product producers, it is not surprising 
that those processors apply mandatory standards and schemes and restrict their relationships 
with suppliers to the basic commitments and principals as regulated in the cooperatives’ 
statute. Nevertheless, the co-ops’ relationships seem to be better developed at the procurement 
stage than at the distribution stage. We could identify operational partnerships between the 
co-ops and their milk suppliers and some dyadic actions addressing the chosen quality 
strategy at this stage, but there is still a missing recognition of similar interests and initiatives 
to explore operational advantages in relationships with their institutional customers. Further 
development of retailers and wholesalers with strong bargaining power will force the dairies 
either to join their SCN or take the role of a focal company and strengthen their brand. 
Independent of that, the dairy must first create its supply chain network and develop a chain 
quality management. 
6 Final  remarks 
Our survey on Polish dairy co-operatives provides new insights into quality management 
issues faced by cooperatives. First, our findings indicate that activities related to quality 
improvements are generally aligned with current market opportunities for optimal enterprise 
performance. On the one hand, co-ops recognise that they must deliver safe and reliable food 
and differentiate their products, at least in a partial way, to make them more attractive to the 
consumer. This indicates that even for the co-ops, food quality is more than plain food safety 
and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set of attributes. On the other 
hand, co-ops face various problems, the largest of them being the conflict between the co-ops’ 
principles and economic goals and limited financial and qualified human resources that would 
significantly improve both process and product quality. The co-ops’ specific problems compel 
them to modify their production profile and usually to tap markets for basic products, since 
they are hardly able to compete with more flexible and strictly profit-oriented private 
enterprises on markets for high-value added products. However, our study reveals that there 
are some exceptions to this general observation, especially when examining the co-ops’ 
chosen quality strategy and the design of the quality management systems. Overall, we 
conclude that in most cases, supply chain networks are established and chain quality 
management is exercised. However, this is only the case if there is a focal actor that 
influences its network structure. The results show that retail chains and industrial purchasers 
with foreign investment and strong bargaining power usually take the position of the focal 
firm in the SCN. In those cases, strategic partnering between the individual chain stages dominates. However, because there is a lack of a collective quality strategy overlapping all 
actors, quality management initiatives are still operational in this case. There are still some 
Polish co-operative dairies that are not embedded in any SCN. These concern processors of 
non-branded goods or those with weak brands that sell their products to purchasers without a 
focal position. Because there is no powerful focal firm in the chain, no managerial discretion 
can be exerted and no chain quality management concepts can be installed. Thus, we could 
only identify operational partnerships between the co-ops and their milk suppliers and some 
dyadic actions addressing the chosen quality strategy at the procurement stage. In contrast, at 
the distribution stage we observed that the partners do not share homogenous interests 
regarding quality issues; there is even a lack of dyadic initiatives aimed at exploring the 
operational advantages of the cooperation. 
Our empirical results show profound diversity regarding quality management approaches in 
the Polish milk supply chains. However, one thing is clear: The chosen quality strategy 
determines the design of the vertical coordination mechanism. Thus, the higher the product 
requirements, the further quality management systems go beyond a firm’s boundaries and the 
stronger is the shift from operational towards strategic quality management. 
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